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INTRODUCTION
Every day I tell the staff at the Justice Department: “Think anew. The world is
changing. What are the ways we can safeguard the American people against
attack?” … I say, “Think outside the box,” but I always say, “think inside the
Constitution.”
Attorney General John Ashcroft, speaking to the Associated Press1
The media,2 legal academics,3 and the organized bar4 have quite rightly focused
considerable attention on an array of extraordinary law enforcement actions by the Bush
Administration in waging its “War on Terrorism.” As of this writing at the beginning of January
2004, these high profile issues are now being considered by, inter alia, by the various United
States Courts of Appeals and by the United States Supreme Court on petitions for certiorari and
on the merits. They include: (1) whether a U.S. citizen unilaterally declared by the Executive
Branch to be an “enemy combatant,” has a right to consult counsel and to judicial review of his
status;5 (2) whether aliens detained indefinitely by the Department of Defense outside the United
States as “unlawful enemy combatants” (and thus without the humanitarian protections afforded
“prisoners of war” under the Geneva Convention) are forever barred from exercising their treaty
right to challenge that punitive status in the United States or elsewhere;6 (3) whether the
Freedom of Information Act obliges the Department of Justice to identify resident aliens secretly
arrested and detained in the United States in post-September 11 dragnets;7 (4) whether the
Department of Justice may, by general order, require the otherwise open deportation hearings of
such secretly arrested aliens to be held in secret;8 and (5) whether the President, acting pursuant
to, inter alia, his Article I War Powers, may deprive a defendant, accused in a federal court of
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capital terrorism crimes, access to exculpatory evidence to which he would otherwise be entitled
under the Sixth Amendment.9
There is yet another important constitutional issue recently addressed by the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit which has not received the widespread attention of the cases
identified above. It arises out of Attorney General Ashcroft’s announcement shortly after the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 that the “aggressive detention of material witnesses [was]
vital to preventing, disrupting or delaying new attacks.”10 Since that time, the Department of
Justice has used the federal material witness statute11 to arrest numerous individuals and detain
them indefinitely in the general prison population for the ostensible purpose of securing future
grand jury testimony. These individuals, while held pursuant to the statute, are not charged with
any crime; nor, upon their detention, is there any probable cause that they have committed a
crime.12 While the Justice Department’s aggressive use of the federal material witness statute
may reflect the Attorney General’s directive to “think outside the box,” the “box” at issue may
very well be the Constitution of the United States. Described immediately below are the factual
findings, which were uncontested on appeal, in one of the two leading federal district court cases
addressing the Justice Department’s material witness detention activities. These facts serve to
illustrate the constitutionally questionable nature of this practice.
I. GRAND JURY MATERIAL WITNESS DETENTION
A.

The Detention of Osama Awadallah

The following factual findings surrounding Osama Awadallah’s initial detention and
interrogation were made by Judge Shira Scheindlin of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York.13 On September 20, 2001 Awadallah — a Jordanian citizen, lawful
permanent resident of the United States, and Muslim14 — woke up and made his way to class at
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Grossmont College in San Diego, California.15 In 1999, he had come to the United States at age
18 to be near his father, three brothers, and stepmother.16 Since his arrival, he had held many
part-time jobs and attended classes.17 He planned to become a United States citizen like his
father and oldest brother.18
In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon, FBI agents had found the name “Osama” and a phone number written on a slip of
paper in the car of one of the hijackers, which was parked in a Dulles Airport parking lot in
Northern Virginia.19 Through a search of phone listings, the FBI matched the number to Osama
Awadallah.20 Awadallah had not used that phone number in over a year.21 Nevertheless, no less
than eight FBI agents arrived at Awadallah’s San Diego apartment on September 20, 2001 to
question him regarding his knowledge of the attacks.22
When the FBI arrived at Awadallah’s apartment around 10:15 a.m., no one was home.23
A little over an hour later, Awadallah’s roommate returned.24 FBI agents approached his
roommate and asked if they could question him and search the apartment. He consented to both
requests.25 At about 2:00 p.m., Awadallah arrived home from class to rest and to pray and was
greeted by two FBI agents.26 They asked him if they could question him briefly.27 He agreed,
but when he tried to enter his apartment, the agents prevented him from doing so.28 Awadallah
insisted upon obtaining access to his apartment bathroom “because, as a devout Muslim, he prays
five times a day including once at midday …” and “[b]efore each prayer, [he] washes his mouth,
nose, face, head, hands, and feet.”29 After consulting with each other and checking the apartment
first, the FBI agents relented and permitted Awadallah to enter.30
Upon entering, “Awadallah realized for the first time that his roommate … was being
interviewed.”31 Awadallah then tried to use the bathroom in his apartment, but FBI agents
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“ordered him to leave [the door] open” while they watched him urinate and wash before prayer.32
Awadallah and his roommate, also a Muslim, managed to pray, but under the watchful eye of the
FBI agents.33 After Awadallah and his roommate finished praying, the FBI agents asked him to
sign a consent form giving the FBI the ability to search his apartment and car.34 The agents told
Awadallah that if he did not sign the consent form, they would get a warrant and would “tear up
the home.”35
Although Awadallah asked if the agents could interview him in his apartment, the agents
insisted that he go to the FBI San Diego office in an FBI vehicle.36 Awadallah got into the FBI
vehicle, but quickly realized he had left his watch in the apartment.37 He tried to get out of the
vehicle, but found the doors were locked.38 Seeing this, he decided not to ask the agents if he
could retrieve his watch.39
The agents told him that the questioning would take about a half hour and assured him
that they would “do their best” to get him back in time for his 6:00 p.m. class.40 He “repeatedly
expressed that he did not want to miss his computer class.”41 In spite of their assurances, FBI
agents kept him in a locked room at their offices from 3:10 p.m. until 11:00 p.m., questioning
him for over six of those hours.42 Awadallah was “very, very cooperative,” and answered all
their questions.43 The agents told him that “they believed him,” but “‘to clear the table,’ they
wanted him to take a lie detector [polygraph] test,” which he agreed to do the next morning.44
The FBI agents then drove him home.45
Sometime after 11:00 p.m., he went to the mosque where he told his brothers what had
happened.46 His brothers advised him not to return for a polygraph test until they had secured a
lawyer for him.47 The next morning, Awadallah called the FBI and told them that he wanted to
wait to take the polygraph test until he had a lawyer.48 The FBI agent, however, persuaded
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Awadallah to go through with the test, advising Awadallah that “there [was] no need for anybody
to come with [him].”49 They also told him they “would not bother him anymore” after he took
the test.50 After Awadallah agreed to take the test, FBI agents returned to his apartment and
transported him to their offices.51
The FBI questioned Awadallah for approximately an hour and a half to two hours, during
which they were in communication (outside of Awadallah’s presence) with their legal counsel,
an Assistant United States Attorney in New York.52 After questioning Awadallah during the
polygraph test on his knowledge of the September 11th hijackers, the FBI agents accused
Awadallah of lying.53 When Awadallah tried to leave, the FBI agents ordered him not to move.54
Awadallah requested a lawyer, but the agents refused this request and continued questioning
him, stating that they were going to take him to New York and “detain him ‘for one year’ so that
they could ‘find out’ more about him.”55 Awadallah again demanded a lawyer, but the agents
responded, “Here you don’t have rights. When you go [to the San Diego Metropolitan
Correctional Center] or you go to New York, then you [can] ask whatever you want.”56 After his
questioning, he was arrested as a material witness pending a grand jury investigation of the
September 11th terrorist attacks.57 He was not informed of any constitutional rights at this
time.58
Awadallah was then sent to the San Diego Metropolitan Correctional Center
(“SDMCC”).59 Because Awadallah’s allegations of abuse during his incarceration, i.e., postSeptember 21, 2001, were “not material to the issues before the court,” Judge Scheindlin did not
make factual findings on disputed matters regarding his confinement.60 However, she noted that
“many” of his allegations regarding treatment during detention were uncontested.61
Furthermore, a series of widely-publicized United States Department of Justice - Office of the
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Inspector General reports issued in 2003 fully corroborated allegations of abuse by September 11
detainees in a nearby detention facilities quite similar to the one in which Awadallah was
imprisoned.62 Even reading Awadallah’s claims regarding the conditions of his confinement in a
light most favorable to the Government, Judge Scheindlin wrote, “Awadallah bore the full
weight of a prison system designed to punish convicted criminals,” when he was only a material
witness.63
Upon his detention in SDMCC, Awadallah’s family hired a lawyer, Randall Hamud, who
went to the SDMCC on September 21 to speak with his client.64 The lawyer was denied access
to Awadallah, and Awadallah was never informed that his lawyer was at the prison.65 His lawyer
was not able to see Awadallah until the next day.66 While at the SDMCC, Awadallah was kept
in solitary confinement; denied the use of the showers for four days; and was refused soap and
toilet paper for two days.67 When the toilet in his cell backed up and flooded his cell floor, “[t]he
correctional facility did not fix the problem for at least two days.”68 Awadallah could not eat
while at SDMCC, because “the correctional facility only served him non-halal meals,” i.e., food
that does not comply with Muslim dietary law.69
On September 27, Awadallah was transferred to the San Bernardino County Jail
(“SBCJ”) for one day.70 While at the SBCJ, Awadallah was forced to strip naked before a
female officer.71 A guard “twisted his arm, forced him to bow and pushed his face to the
floor.”72 The SBCJ provided him with only one meal, and it did not satisfy his dietary
requirements; thus, Awadallah “only ate an apple the entire day” he was detained at the SBCJ.73
The next day, September 28th, the government transferred Awadallah to a federal facility in
Oklahoma City.74 There, “a guard threw shoes at his head and face, cursed at him and made
insulting remarks about [Islam].”75
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On October 1, 2001, United States marshals transported Awadallah, shackled in leg irons,
to New York City.76 While in transit, the “marshals threatened to get Awadallah’s brother and
cursed ‘the Arabs.’”77 Once at the Metropolitan Correctional Center in New York ("NYMCC"),
he was placed in a room “so cold that his body turned blue.”78 After a doctor examined him, a
guard “push[ed] him into a door and a wall while he was handcuffed, kicked his leg shackles and
pulled him by the hair to force him to face an American flag.”79 This man-handling caused
Awadallah’s hand to bleed.80 When the marshals transported Awadallah, whose hands were
cuffed behind his back and bound to his feet, to court the next day, they grabbed his upper arms
so hard they bruised.81 The marshals kicked his left foot until it bled, and “the supervising
marshal threatened to kill him.”82 In the NYMCC, he was “kept in solitary confinement and
shackled and strip-searched whenever he left his cell.”83 He was never assured that his food
complied with his dietary needs for the first few weeks of his confinement; therefore, he
“refrained from eating any meat, or any food that touched the meat” which resulted in eating
little or no food all day.84 As he was not permitted to use the phone or receive family visitors
either at the Oklahoma facility or the NYMCC, Awadallah’s attorney, Hamud, did not know
where his client was located until October 1.85
Nineteen days after he was first detained in San Diego, Awadallah, while shackled to his
chair, finally testified before a grand jury in New York on October 10, 200186 and October 15,
2001.87 In his first grand jury testimony, he denied knowledge of the name of one of the
hijackers, Khalid Al-Mihdhar.88 He was then shown one of his college exam booklets where he
had written the name “Khalid” in answer to an exam question asking him to describe in English
people he had met.89 During his second grand jury testimony he tried to recant and explain his
confusion on October 10.90 Eight days later—27 days after he was first detained as a material
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witness—the United States filed a complaint against him alleging that he committed perjury by
falsely testifying at the grand jury that he did not know the name of one of the hijackers.91 He
was “arrested” on the perjury complaint on October 21 and was indicted on October 31, 2001.92
Awadallah requested bail three times before being granted it on November 21, 2001.93 He
posted bail on December 13, 2001 and was released after spending a total of eighty-three days in
jail.94 Over two years later, with his perjury charges still in effect, Awadallah remains free, and
has fully satisfied his release conditions.95
B.

Protection of a Legitimate Government Interest or Pretext?

It is quite clear that the post-September 11 Justice Department detention of individuals
under the federal material witness statute, without probable cause of having committed a crime,
to secure grand jury testimony, is now widely practiced within the United States.96
The Justice Department argues that the plain language of the federal material witness
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3144, authorizes its lengthy detention of material witnesses pending future
grand jury testimony. The statute provides, “[i]f … the testimony of a person is material in a
criminal proceeding, and … it may become impracticable to secure the presence of the person by
subpoena, a judicial officer may order the arrest of the person ….”97 The government points in
particular to the breadth of the term “criminal proceeding” under section 3144 to argue that the
authority extends not only to arresting and imprisoning material witnesses for criminal trials, but
also for grand jury investigations. The government justifies the practice as protecting a
legitimate and compelling government interest in the investigation, disruption, and prevention of
terrorism, and as necessary to assure the presence of important witnesses, who are likely to flee
the jurisdiction or even the country.98
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Section 3144 has been widely recognized as applicable to the detention of witnesses
pending a criminal trial, a practice that generally has been constitutionally sanctioned. 99
However, the legitimacy of holding an innocent material witness pending trial is tempered by
section 3144’s provision of two ameliorative options: release of the material witness on bail, or
in the absence of granting bail, a prompt deposition in lieu of detention. Section 3144 provides,
“No material witness may be detained because of inability to comply with any condition of
release if the testimony of such witness can adequately be secured by deposition, and if further
detention is not necessary to prevent a failure of justice….”100 Therefore, a material witness
detained pending trial may have his or her deposition taken “within a reasonable period of time”
pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 15 (hereinafter Rule 15) in exchange for his or
her release.101 The Government, up until the time it reversed its position before the Second
Circuit, contended that Rule 15’s express terms do not apply to grand jury proceedings,102 and
therefore, a material witness in a grand jury investigation may be held indefinitely pending the
convening of a grand jury, if he or she was not afforded bail.103
The fundamental purpose of a grand jury is to protect the accused from “hasty, malicious
and oppressive persecution” and to ensure that charges are grounded on reason, not malice or ill
will.104 Yet, if the government can obtain material witness warrants to detain and imprison grand
jury material witnesses indefinitely, it can easily sidestep the Fourth Amendment’s probable
cause requirement. It is clear that the Ashcroft Justice Department detains grand jury material
witnesses under harsh and coercive conditions.105 Facts surrounding the recent arrests of other
grand jury material witnesses illustrate that these indefinite and often harsh detentions are part of
a tactic to coerce incriminating statements.106
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The case of Abdallah Higazy has become a classic illustration of this technique. Higazy,
an Egyptian national, was detained on a material witness warrant, pending the convening of a
grand jury.107 He was an engineering student attending classes at Brooklyn Polytechnic.108 On
September 11, 2001, he was staying at the Millennium Hilton Hotel, across from the World
Trade Center (“WTC”) in New York City, when he was forced to evacuate with the other guests
soon after the terrorist attacks on the WTC. 109 Several weeks after the attacks, management
conducted an inventory of the still vacant hotel.110 A security guard for the hotel reported
finding a radio transceiver together with Higazy’s passport and a copy of the Koran in Higazy’s
room.111 The guard claimed that all of these items were in the room’s safe, which is provided for
guests’ valuables.112 The radio could be used for air-to-air and air-to-ground communication.113
Consequently, FBI questioned Higazy, when he returned to the hotel on December 17, 2001 to
obtain the belongings he left behind.114 Higazy denied the transceiver was his, but admitted that
he was familiar with such radios, because he had previously served in the Egyptian Air Corps.115
Hearing this, the Government detained Higazy and petitioned for a material witness warrant
pending his testimony before a grand jury.116 The court granted the petition on December 18,
2001 on the basis of the hotel security guard’s assertion that the radio was with Higazy’s
possessions left behind at the hotel and ordered that Higazy be held “for up to ten days for the
purpose of securing his appearance before the grand jury.”117
To clear himself, Higazy offered to take a polygraph test, to which the Government
agreed.118 However, the polygraph test, given on December 27, 2001, quickly metamorphosed
into an interrogation without the presence of counsel.119 The FBI pressured and threatened
Higazy to the point that he believed he had no choice but to confess to owning the radio.120 At a
hearing on December 28, 2001 to review the continued detention of Higazy as a material
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witness, the Government presented the confession as evidence that continued detention was
necessary.121 The court ordered material witness detention until January 14, 2002.122 However,
the Government never presented Higazy to a grand jury, but charged him with making material
false statements on January 11, 2002, presumably based on his polygraph admission.123
However, the detention order was vacated on January 14, 2002 — the same day an American
pilot went to the Millennium Hilton Hotel to claim his belongings of which the transceiver was
one.124 This revelation prompted the FBI to investigate further.125 Upon finding that the hotel
security guard had lied repeatedly, the Government dropped the charges against Higazy and
released him on January 16, 2002 after having detained him in the general prison population for
30 days.126
C. Conflicting District Court Interpretations of Section 3144
Prior to the Second Circuit’s resolution of the meaning and validity of section 3144,127
two federal district court judges in the Southern District of New York had issued seemingly
inconsistent rulings on the Justice Department’s use of the federal material witness statute to
hold a witness indefinitely for grand jury proceedings: United States v. Awadallah (Awadallah
III) and In re the Application of the United States for a Material Witness Warrant.128 Because
the Second Circuit draws heavily from the two lower court decisions, each is discussed
immediately below and in Parts IV and V of this Article.
The facts underlying Awadallah III have already been discussed at length above. It is
important to note for this Article’s discussion, however, that several district court opinions have
been issued in this case. In Awadallah I, Judge Scheindlin granted bail to Awadallah, subject to
certain conditions, after he had been indicted on perjury charges.129 In Awadallah II, Judge
Scheindlin denied the Awadallah’s motion to dismiss his perjury charge, but granted his request
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for an evidentiary hearing on the admissibility of, inter alia, his grand jury testimony.130 In
Awadallah III, the court held that Awadallah was unlawfully detained pending his grand jury
appearance, because the federal material witness statute does not allow for the arrest of material
witnesses pending grand jury proceedings, and therefore, his purportedly incriminating grand
jury testimony was not admissible as the fruit of the unlawful detention.131 The court suggested
that if the statute permitted indefinite detention of grand jury material witnesses, it would not
survive Fourth Amendment scrutiny.132 In Awadallah IV, the court suppressed virtually all of the
Government’s evidence for use at Awadallah’s perjury trial on grounds that it was seized in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.133 Consequently, Awadallah’s eighty-three days in jail
resulted in the dismissal of the indictment, 134 until the Second Circuit reversed and remanded the
trial court’s decision.135 This Article focuses heavily on the legal rationale in Awadallah III and
its treatment on appeal in the Second Circuit, but some information also is drawn from each of
the four Awadallah district court cases.
Less than three months after Judge Scheindlin's decisions in Awadallah III and IV, Chief
Judge Michael Mukasey of the Southern District of New York declined to follow his colleague’s
reasoning in In Re the Application of the United States for a Material Witness Warrant (“In Re
Material Witness Warrant”).136 In denying the defendant’s motion for release or in the
alternative, for a deposition in lieu of detention, the court held that the federal material witness
statute does in fact apply to grand jury witnesses and is otherwise constitutional.137 Neither party
appealed Chief Judge Mukasey’s ruling.
II. HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL MATERIAL WITNESS STATUTE
A material witness is a non-party who has particular information about a crime that could
be helpful to the defense or prosecution.138 At common law and in courts of equity, a person
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designated as a witness was viewed as having a duty to appear in court and could be served with
process or a subpoena.139 The philosophy behind material witness detention has its roots in
English law, where every citizen owed a duty to his King.140 That has evolved in the United
States as a duty to the courts.141 Thus, the policy behind these statutes is to ensure the
appearance of material witnesses at trial for the swift and fair administration of justice.142
The laws that form the basis of the material witness statute are the Judiciary Act of 1789
and the Bail Reform Act. The Judiciary Act143 formally recognized the duty of witnesses to
appear and testify and required recognizance from material witnesses in criminal proceedings.144
An 1846 amendment to the Judiciary Act of 1789 further clarified the federal courts' authority to
arrest and requires assurances that a witness would appear in a trial for "any criminal cause or
proceeding."145 If a material witness failed to give such assurances, he or she could be confined
until his or her testimony was given.146
Congress enacted the Bail Reform Act of 1966147 to “modernize the pretrial release
system in [the] federal courts.”148 The Act continued to authorize courts to set bail for material
witnesses, but with the added caveat that a material witness unable to post bail could not be
detained if his or her testimony could be adequately secured by deposition.149 However,
Congress disallowed the detention of material witnesses if their testimony could “adequately be
secured” by deposition and “further detention [was] not necessary to prevent a failure of
justice.”150 Congress amended the Bail Reform Act again in 1984 to clarify the authority of the
courts in making pretrial release decisions.151 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure also
were amended in 1966 and 1984 to reflect the Bail Reform Act and subsequent amendments
thereto.152 With the exception of a change that restored the explicit power to arrest material
witnesses, the federal material witness statute was virtually unmodified in 1984.153 In passing
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the 1984 amendments to the Bail Reform Act, Congress made it clear that “whenever possible”
material witness should not be detained, even those so unreliable that bail could not be granted, if
his or her testimony could be secured by deposition.154
Although detention of material witnesses has been practiced in the United States since
1789, the federal government engaged in the practice before September 11 primarily for
detaining witnesses for criminal trials. In that long history, the federal material witness statute
has never been challenged under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.155
One critical reason that the statute has escaped a Fourth Amendment unreasonableness analysis
may very well be that any arrests and imprisonments made pursuant to the statute have been
tempered by the granting of bail, or in lieu of bail, the taking of a prompt deposition to preserve
the witness’ testimony for trial.156 The relatively rare use157 of the federal material witness
statute to detain a witness pending the convening of a grand jury is evidenced by the fact that
there is only one pre-September 11 case, Bacon v. United States,158 that meaningfully addresses
the constitutionality of imprisoning a grand jury material witness in the absence of probable
cause under the Fourth Amendment.
III. BACON V. UNITED STATES
A. Facts and Procedural History
On April 22, 1971, a United States District Judge for the Western District of Washington
issued a material witness arrest warrant for Leslie Bacon solely on the basis of the prosecution’s
affidavit that summarily alleged she would not respond to a subpoena to testify before a grand
jury and would try to flee the court’s jurisdiction.159 The warrant set bail for $100,000.160
Pursuant to the warrant, FBI agents arrested her and served her with a grand jury subpoena in the
District of Columbia on April 27.161 At the removal hearing before the United States District
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Court for the District of Columbia on April 28, she moved to quash the arrest warrant or, in the
alternative, to reduce bail.162 The district court denied her motion and ordered her transfer to the
state of Washington.163 Although she appeared before a grand jury in the state of Washington on
April 30, May 1, and May 2, Bacon refused to answer questions, and a contempt order was
entered against her.164 Bacon filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds, inter
alia, that her arrest and incarceration without probable cause and the imposition of $100,000 bail
were invalid.165 The court in the Western District of Washington denied the petition, and Bacon
appealed to the Ninth Circuit.166
B. Ninth Circuit’s Holding and Reasoning
1. Grand Jury Proceedings as Criminal Proceedings. After first establishing as a
general matter that an uncooperative material witness may be arrested and detained under the
then extant federal material witness statute and Rule 46(b) (governing release from custody), the
Ninth Circuit addressed the more specific question of whether the statute’s and rule’s reference
to “criminal proceedings” included within their scope grand jury proceedings. The Bacon court
answered affirmatively by first reasoning that the authorizing legislation for the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure stated, “[t]he Supreme Court of the United States shall have the power to
prescribe, from time to time, rules of pleading, practice and procedure with respect to any or all
proceedings prior to and including verdict … in criminal cases,” and therefore, the term
“criminal proceedings” must include grand jury proceedings.167 The court then concluded that,
in promulgating the Rules, the Supreme Court expressly exercised its authority to the fullest
based on Rule 2, which states, “[t]hese rules are intended to provide for the just determination of
every criminal proceeding.”168 Finally, the Ninth Circuit noted that other rules expressly apply
or have been interpreted to apply to grand jury proceedings.169 Specifically, Rule 6 “authorizes
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the summoning of grand juries and establishes procedures to govern their operation,” and Rule
17 provides for the subpoena power in both criminal trials and grand jury investigations.170
Accordingly, it concluded that the term “criminal proceedings” as used throughout the Rules
must apply to grand jury proceedings.171
2. Constitutionality of Bacon’s Arrest and Detention. Ms. Bacon argued that, even if
as a general matter the federal material witness provision’s reference to “criminal proceedings”
includes grand jury matters, the statute and accompanying rule are unconstitutional on their face,
because, inter alia, imprisoning a material witness without probable cause violates the
Constitution.172 However, the Ninth Circuit refused to decide the facial attack on these
provisions, because Ms. Bacon had not properly briefed the issue.173
3. Validity of the Arrest Warrant and Custody Order. Although the Ninth Circuit did
not address the facial constitutionality of arresting and detaining material witnesses pursuant to
the federal material witness statute or Rule 46(b), it did rule that the issuance of a material
witness arrest warrant on the facts of that case violated the Fourth Amendment.174 In so doing,
the Ninth Circuit determined that any material witness arrest and detention, whether for trial or
for grand jury, must be supported by evidence of impracticability, i.e., “sufficient facts must be
shown to give the judicial officer probable cause to believe that it may be impracticable to secure
the presence of the witness by subpoena. Mere assertion will not do.”175 The court found the
summary evidence presented by the Government in its affidavit seeking the arrest of Ms. Bacon
was not sufficient to conclude that she would be likely to flee.176 Thus, the Ninth Circuit held
that the warrant and subsequent arrest were unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, and
therefore, invalid as applied to the specific circumstances of Bacon’s case.177
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IV. UNITED STATES V. AWADALLAH
Awadallah III is the first case since Bacon to address whether the federal material witness
statute applies to grand jury witnesses. Like the Ninth Circuit, the Awadallah III court had to
determine whether the term “criminal proceeding” in the statute included grand jury
proceedings.178 Also like the Ninth Circuit, Judge Scheindlin acknowledged that the term on its
face created “some uncertainty.”179 However, unlike the Ninth Circuit, Judge Scheindlin
declared that the structure of the statute itself clarifies any ambiguity found in section 3144.180
She stated, “When construed in context, the phrase ‘criminal proceeding’ in section 3144 could
not be clearer,”181 i.e., it does not apply to grand juries.
A. The Bail Reform Act and the Material Witness Statute
1. Language and Structure.—To develop the statutory context upon which she relied,
Judge Scheindlin focused on the federal material witness statute’s key words: “If it appears from
an affidavit filed by a party, that the testimony of a person is material in a criminal proceeding,
and it is shown” that it could be “impracticable” to secure his testimony via subpoena, the
witness may be detained according to “the provisions of section 3142.”182 The court initially
concentrated on the word “party,” a term which Judge Scheindlin concluded plainly relates to an
adversarial process where at least two opposing parties exist.183 She reasoned further that since
grand jury proceedings are investigative in nature and not adversarial, no “party” exists until the
grand jury has completed its investigation and returned an indictment.184 Therefore, Judge
Scheindlin concluded that section 3144’s reference to a “party” makes clear that it is not
applicable to grand jury proceedings.185
She also found section 3144’s applicability to “material” witnesses instructive.186 She
noted that, in a trial context, a court may easily determine “materiality” by examining all the
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evidence presented.187 However, she explained that a “materiality” determination cannot be
made in the context of grand jury investigations, because they are secretive in nature.188 Courts
cannot usually make inquiries into such proceedings.189 Consequently, to determine whether a
grand jury witness was “material,” a judge would simply have to rest upon the bald assertions of
a government agent, thereby essentially abdicating a judicial responsibility.190 She therefore
found that section 3144’s reference to a “material witness” made it clear that the statute did not
address grand jury matters.191
Furthermore, Judge Scheindlin noted that section 3144 expressly incorporates section
3142.192 Section 3142 governs “Release or detention of a defendant pending trial.”193 Indeed,
she noted that factors listed in section 3142 to be weighed when making detention determinations
do not apply to grand jury witnesses.194 Section 3142 requires an inquiry into the “nature and
circumstances” of the charges; the “weight of the evidence” against the person charged; the
accused’s “history and characteristics;” and the type and degree of danger posed if the court
released the person charged.195 She concluded that applying these factors to a grand jury context
would be like trying “to fit a square peg into a round hole.” 196 Clearly, the first, second, and
fourth factors do not apply to a material witness, because a witness has not been charged with
any crime—he or she has only observed the commission of a crime.197 Since a judge cannot
apply three of the four factors to a material witness in the grand jury context, Judge Scheindlin
found yet another interpretive “clue” showing that section 3144 does not apply to grand jury
proceedings.198
Finally, the judge noted that the federal material witness statute is encompassed within
the entire Bail Reform Act,199 and she found no reference to grand jury proceedings within the
entirety of that Act.200 While examining section 3141, a part of the Bail Reform Act that governs
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the release of individuals, the court stated the “only two situations” where a judicial officer could
release or detain a person was “pending trial” or “pending sentence or appeal.”201 The court
concluded that neither situation was broad enough to include grand jury proceedings.202 Section
3146, another pertinent section of the Act, punishes those who fail to appear in court as a
defendant or material witness,203 but the court noted a grand jury has “never been viewed as a
‘court.’”204 Again, Judge Scheindlin concluded that, when section 3144 was construed as a part
of the much larger Bail Reform Act, the federal material witness statute could not apply to grand
jury proceedings.
2. Legislative History.Turning to legislative history of the Bail Reform Act, the
“bedrock of the current material witness statute,”205 the Awadallah III court recognized that
virtually all legislative references to the federal material witness statute focused on how to secure
the appearance of material witnesses for trial, not for grand jury proceedings.206 Judge
Scheindlin noted that the only legislative reference to the application of the material witness
statute to grand jury proceedings is found in a report submitted to the Senate criticizing the entire
federal material witness statute as being unconstitutional.207 She also noted that the
commentaries published on the material witness statute before and after its enactment in 1966
only discussed the practice of detaining material witnesses pending trial, not for grand jury
proceedings.208
The court was further impressed by the fact that when the Bail Reform Act was amended
in 1984, only two changes were made to the federal material witness statute: judicial officers
gained the explicit authorization to issue arrest warrants for material witnesses, and they could
order the detention of a material witness if no conditions of release would assure the witness’
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appearance.209 Neither change, she concluded, gave the Government authority to apply the
federal material witness statute to grand jury witnesses.210
B. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
The Awadallah III court also reviewed the two rules, as they were worded at the time of
Awadallah’s detention, expressly relating to the federal material witness statute: Rule 15
(governing depositions) and Rule 46 (controlling the release from custody prior to trial).211 If a
deposition is sought by the material witness, and the judge allows it, section 3144 demonstrates a
strong bias for the release of a material witness after the government takes the deposition, 212
unless of course, probable cause develops through the deposition to arrest the witness on
criminal charges. However, the Government argued before Judge Scheindlin that it was not
required to take Mr. Awadallah's deposition under the statute and could detain him indefinitely,
because Rule 15 expressly applies to depositions in the pre-trial and not the grand jury
context.213 Agreeing with the Government’s reading of the plain language of Rule 15,214 she
reasoned that, by applying its deposition reference exclusively to the pre-trial context, Congress
could not have intended the material witness statute to apply to grand jury witnesses.215 She said
the differences between grand juries and pretrial proceedings were too “critical” and too
“obvious” for Congress to have meant otherwise.216 As for Rule 46, the court viewed this rule’s
express reference to “release prior to trial” as further convincing evidence that the statute only
applies to witnesses held for trial, not for grand jury proceedings.217
C. Bacon Distinguished
The Awadallah III court acknowledged that the only interpretive authority for the
proposition that the federal material witness statute can be used to detain grand jury material
witnesses is the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Bacon.218 The court noted, however, that Bacon, as a
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Ninth Circuit decision, was not binding on the Southern District of New York.219 Second, the
Awadallah III court concluded that Bacon's discussion about whether the federal material
witness statute applies to grand jury witnesses was dicta,220 because it was wholly unnecessary to
Bacon’s ultimate holding that under the circumstances of that case, her arrest was
unconstitutional.221 Furthermore, the Bacon court’s reliance on the fact that Rules 2, 6, and 17
specifically apply to grand juries necessitates a finding that Rule 46 must also apply to grand
juries222 was “preposterous because it would lead to the conclusion that [every Federal] Rule[] of
Criminal Procedure…extend[s] to grand juries.”223 Indeed, she noted that, while making its own
contextual argument based on, inter alia, Rules 2, 6, and 17, the Ninth Circuit failed to conduct a
contextual analysis of critical words within the federal material witness statute itself such as
“party” and “material,” which strongly suggest it does not apply to grand juries.224
D. Constitutional Considerations
The Awadallah III court held that even if a possible reading of the federal material
witness statute suggested applying it to grand jury witnesses, the dubious constitutional result
would preclude the court from that interpretation.225 Noting that the test for reasonableness of a
seizure under the Fourth Amendment requires balancing the nature and quality of the intrusion
against the importance of the governmental interest at stake,226 the Awadallah III court pointed
out that a grand jury witness who is detained loses the right to liberty in order to aid an ex parte
investigation of criminal activity, which could be triggered by mere “tips” or “rumors.”227 In the
context of arresting and detaining a material witness prior to criminal trial, the court explained
that the statute is objectively reasonable, because in the absence of bail, the deposition provision
in the federal material witness statute achieves a reasonable balance between society's interest in
enforcing the law, the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him, and
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the material witness' liberty interest.228 That is, the government can detain a witness who might
otherwise flee long enough to conduct a prompt deposition, as long as the deposition will
adequately capture the material witness’ testimony, and release would not cause a “failure of
justice.”229 However, this balance is eviscerated when the material witness statute is applied to
grand jury witnesses.230 Because she agreed with the Government that Rule 15, as it existed at
the time of Awadallah’s arrest,231 did not afford a grand jury material witness the right to a
deposition in lieu of incarceration, she concluded that there is no counterbalancing factor.232
Under Bacon’s reading, grand jury witnesses can be held indefinitely like regular prisoners on
the basis of a “tip” or “rumor.”233 The court determined that this lack of a reasonable balance
would make the federal material witness statute unconstitutional if applied to grand jury
witnesses.234
The court emphasized that the unreasonableness of the seizure was aggravated by the
harsh nature of the detention in Awadallah III.235 Judge Scheindlin focused on the Supreme
Court’s explanation in Terry v. Ohio236 that the government has an interest in “effective crime
prevention and detection” that may justify temporary seizure, but a detention must be
“reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place.”237 In Awadallah III, she found that Awadallah’s austere imprisonment as a high-security
inmate was well outside the scope of the necessities of the investigation.238 The court further
observed that “‘[i]n our society liberty is the norm and detention without trial is the carefully
limited exception’” but interpreting section 3144 to apply to grand jury witnesses would make
“detention the norm and liberty the exception.”239
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V. IN RE MATERIAL WITNESS WARRANT
Chief Judge Mukasey of the Southern District of New York parted company with Judge
Scheindlin in In re Material Witness Warrant by holding that the federal material witness statute
does apply to grand jury witnesses.240 In analyzing Chief Judge Mukasey’s decision, it must be
noted that the facts were not as well developed as those in Awadallah III. The record in In re
Material Witness Warrant was sealed pursuant to Rule 6(e), which provides for secrecy of grand
jury proceedings.241 However, Judge Mukasey revealed that the material witness in his case was
already being held by the Immigration and Naturalization Service on a deportation order when
the federal prosecutors obtained a material witness warrant and took custody of him.242 Thus,
unlike Awadallah, the material witness before Chief Judge Mukasey had not been removed from
his regular civilian routine to be incarcerated pending the convening of a grand jury.243 Citing
the recent ruling in Awadallah III, the material witness sought to quash his warrant before Chief
Judge Mukasey and enforce his deportation order principally by arguing that section 3144 does
not apply to grand jury witnesses.244 In the alternative, the material witness requested that his
deposition be taken pursuant to section 3144 and Rule 15 in lieu of incarceration pending the
convening of a grand jury.245
A. Bacon Analysis
In finding that the federal material witness statute applies to grand jury proceedings,
Chief Judge Mukasey disagreed with the Awadallah III court’s assessment that Bacon's
discussion of the scope of the federal material witness statute was merely dictum.246 He ruled
that the Ninth Circuit's application of the federal material witness statute applied to grand juries
was a critical step in its ultimate finding that the Government failed to make a sufficient showing
of impracticability to support the warrant for grand jury testimony.247 Chief Judge Mukasey
reasoned:
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If the statute did not authorize issuance of a warrant for the arrest of a grand jury
witness, there would have been no occasion for the Bacon Court to consider
whether the government had made the required showing that it was impracticable
to secure petitioner’s attendance before the grand jury without such a warrant.248
In the Bail Reform Act Amendments’ legislative history, Chief Judge Mukasey also
found what he believed to be dispositive evidence that the federal material witness statute
applied to grand jury proceedings.249 He noted that the Awadallah III court had overlooked a
footnote in a Senate Judiciary Committee report for the enactment of the Bail Reform Act
Amendments in 1984 that expressly cited Bacon for the proposition that the statute applies to
grand jury proceedings.250 The court stated, “[g]enerally, when Congress enacts a statute that
has been interpreted by the courts, it is ‘presumed to be aware of … judicial interpretation of a
statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change.’”251 The court
found this legislative footnote to be conclusive evidence of Congress’ intent to extend the federal
material witness statute to grand jury witnesses.252
B. Plain Meaning of Section 3144
Having concluded that Bacon’s ruling, and the congressional reference to it, was
dispositive, Chief Judge Mukasey went on to attack the notion that the statute’s reference to the
term “criminal proceeding” was ambiguous.253 He read the term “criminal proceeding” as selfevidently comprehensive enough to include grand jury proceedings.254 To support this
conclusion, he cited the fact that the federal material witness statute appears in Title 18 of the
United States Code, which also contains the statutory provisions governing grand jury
proceedings.255 The court also found dispositive (as had the Ninth Circuit in Bacon) that Rule 2
provides “the rules are ‘intended to provide for the just determination of every criminal
proceeding.’”256 Finally, based on a plain reading of the statute, Chief Judge Mukasey
concluded that the reach of Rule 46, which expressly refers to section 3144, is not limited to trial
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witnesses only.257 The court also supported its broad reading of the term "criminal proceeding"
by noting that other similar criminal statutes using that term have been read to include grand jury
proceedings.258 The court noted that cases reaching the opposite result involved statutes wholly
different from the federal material witness statute.259
Chief Judge Mukasey also challenged Awadallah III’s reading of the terms “party” and
“material” within section 3144 to find “criminal proceedings” do not include grand jury
proceedings.260 He argued that the word “party” in the federal material witness statute can apply
self-evidently to “any party of interest,” not just a party to an adversarial proceeding.261 The
court took further issue with the Awadallah III court's conclusion that a materiality determination
cannot be made by a judge exclusively on the basis of the prosecution’s description of the secret
grand jury proceeding.262 He cited three decisions determining that evidence or a witness’
testimony were material based on the representation of the prosecutor alone.263 He also noted
that judges commonly make materiality evaluations when deciding whether to issue subpoenas
based on one party’s representation.264
C. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
Most important for resolving the constitutional conundrum raised by arresting and
indefinitely detaining material witnesses without probable cause pending a grand jury proceeding
is Chief Judge Mukasey’s handling of the question whether such a witness is entitled to a prompt
deposition in lieu of incarceration. Again, section 3144 expressly provides that a deposition
pursuant to Rule 15 is available to a material witness whose appearance at the “criminal
proceeding” may otherwise be “impractical.”265 As shown above, Judge Scheindlin agreed with
the Government’s argument before her and found that Rule 15’s express terms make it applicable
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only to a pre-trial (and not a grand jury) setting.266 Chief Judge Mukasey equivocates on this
issue, finding that the language in Rule 15 points in both directions:
[The] text [of Rule 15], referring as it does to taking a deposition to preserve
testimony “for use at trial,” to a “written motion of the witness … upon notice to
the parties,” to the defendant’s attendance, and to “examination and crossexamination” shows that those who drafted the rule contemplated use of the
deposition at a trial or in some hearing attended by both parties. On the other
hand, just as section 3144 refers to section 3142 as the standard for setting bail
for material witnesses, even though several of the provisions of section 3142
plainly apply only to criminal defendants, it is not inconceivable that a deposition
in aid of a grand jury proceedings might be taken pursuant to Rule 15, using
those provisions of the Rule that would apply.267
Indeed, elsewhere in the opinion, Chief Judge Mukasey reasons that the very rule dealing with
bail eligibility—Rule 46(g)—applies to grand jury witnesses subject to arrest, and it therefore
“suggests that the remedy of testimony by deposition might be available to a grand jury witness
when, for example, the grand jury before whom the witness is to testify cannot convene
promptly.”268
Despite his tantalizing suggestions that Rule 15 may be read to afford a grand jury
witness the right to a deposition in lieu of incarceration, Chief Judge Mukasey, for a whole host
of reasons, concluded, “I need not decide whether Rule 15 is elastic enough to authorize a
deposition in aid of a grand jury investigation.”269 Perhaps the most convincing of those reasons
was that the material witness in his case had never sought to be released on bail, thereby not
squarely raising the issue whether his detention could be shortened by taking his deposition.270
The failure to seek any release is wholly understandable, because the material witness before
Chief Judge Mukasey was otherwise properly being detained subject to his deportation.
D. Constitutional Analysis
Unlike the Awadallah III court, Chief Judge Mukasey perceived no serious constitutional
impediments with the federal material witness statute as applied to grand jury witnesses.271 He
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found two flaws in the Awadallah III court's Fourth Amendment analysis of the statute as applied
to grand jury witnesses. First, he reasoned that the Awadallah III court’s Fourth Amendment
concerns about the reasonableness of detaining grand jury witnesses under the material witness
statute would not disappear if grand jury witnesses were excluded from the reach of the statute,
i.e., material witnesses held for trial without probable cause would still have a Fourth
Amendment claim.272 However, this analysis fails to recognize that in a criminal trial setting, the
material witness has the clear option of being deposed in lieu of detention, whereas in a grand
jury investigation, the Government’s position at that time was that a material witness may did not
have this option. Again, in the history of the federal material witness statute, there has been no
occasion to review lengthy material witness incarcerations pending the convening of a grand jury
under the Fourth Amendment, probably because of the “safety valve” of affording a prompt
deposition of the material witness to secure their trial testimony. As noted above, Judge
Scheindlin found that the deposition option was not open to a grand jury material witness, and so
her constitutional analysis confronted the constitutionality of a lengthy material witness
incarceration in its starkest form.273 Indeed, Chief Judge Mukasey’s ruling that the deposition
issue as applied to grand jury witnesses was not properly before him meant that he issued his
Fourth Amendment ruling in the context of a detainee who, for all intents and purposes, had not
challenged his incarceration. Under these circumstances, it was easier to find no Fourth
Amendment violation.
Second, Chief Judge Mukasey’s supported his reading of section 3144 as being consistent
with the Fourth Amendment by citing case law supporting the reasonableness of detaining a
witness to secure his or her testimony.274 Citing Supreme Court precedent, he stressed the
importance placed on grand jury testimony in federal jurisprudence and noted the duty of every
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citizen “to disclose knowledge of crime.”275 He also pointed out that the Second, Sixth, Eighth
and Ninth Circuits have not found a constitutional problem with the detention of grand jury
witnesses. 276 Yet, none of these cases squarely address the constitutionality of the federal
material witness statute under the Fourth Amendment. Chief Judge Mukasey noted that several
decisions have applied the federal material witness statute to grand jury witnesses.277 The
problem with these cases is that they do not squarely address the issue of whether section 3144
applies to grand jury witnesses nor do they address Fourth Amendment concerns under these
circumstances. Because In re Material Witness was not appealed, a division remained within the
Second Circuit until that appellate court decided Awadallah’s appeal.
VI.

SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF “CONFLICTING” DISTRICT COURT OPINIONS

It is tempting to conclude, as have many commentators, that Judge Scheindlin’s decision
in Awadallah III and Chief Judge Mukasey’s decision in In re Material Witness Warrant are
irreconcilably in conflict and that the Second Circuit would have to choose the approach in one
of these cases over the other.278 After all, Judge Scheindlin found that the federal material
witness statute does not apply to grand jury proceedings.279 Chief Judge Mukasey found that it
did.280
Judge Scheindlin also found the Ninth Circuit’s Bacon ruling that the federal material
witness statute applied to grand jury proceedings to be unpersuasive, because it was dictum, i.e.,
unnecessary to Bacon’s ultimate holding that the grand jury material witness arrest warrant did
not show with requisite constitutional specificity the likely unavailability of the witness in that
case.281 Chief Judge Mukasey, on the other hand, found Bacon’s pronouncement that the federal
material witness statute applied to grand jury proceedings to be vital to the Ninth Circuit’s
holding that the grand jury material witness warrant there lacked constitutional specificity.282 He
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further found Bacon to be in some significant sense “controlling” because, even though decided
by the Ninth Circuit, it was later cited approvingly by a Senate Judiciary Committee report
during the 1984 amendment to the very statute at issue.283
Judge Scheindlin further concluded, if the federal material witness statute were to apply
to grand jury proceedings, it would violate the Fourth Amendment, because it would allow
lengthy incarceration without a showing of probable cause that a crime has been committed.284
In so doing, she determined, in agreement with the Government’s argument before her, that the
statute’s ameliorative reference to a deposition in lieu of incarceration did not apply to the
investigative ex parte grand jury process.285 Chief Judge Mukasey found no such constitutional
problem, but was considerably aided in that result, inter alia, by not closing the door on the
prospect of considerably shortening the detention of an otherwise innocent grand jury witness
through a deposition.286 He thought that Rule 15 could plausibly be read, especially in light of
Rule 46(g), to afford a grand jury material witness the right to a deposition tailored to the
peculiar nature of the grand jury context.287 However, he avoided a determination on the issue
by stating that it had not been properly raised in his case.288
Yet, if Chief Judge Mukasey was right about the availability of a prompt, court-ordered
deposition under Rule 15 to ameliorate an otherwise lengthy and possibly coercive detention of a
grand jury material witness, that would resolve an otherwise seemingly irreconcilable
conundrum between the legitimate interests of the material witness and of the government. On
the one hand, the lengthy imprisonment of what might very well be otherwise innocent persons
pending the convening of a grand jury raises, as Judge Scheindlin found on the facts of
Awadallah III, serious Fourth Amendment questions. Conversely, the government’s concern that
a grand jury material witness might flee the jurisdiction (or the country) before the grand jury
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testimony can be secured is also worthy of consideration. These conflicting tensions could be
resolved in the context of holding a material witness without probable cause for purposes of a
grand jury by the express availability of securing that testimony by a prompt deposition
appropriately tailored to the peculiarities of grand jury proceedings under Rule 15.
If a prompt deposition had been available to Awadallah, the prospect of his lengthy and
almost certainly coercive imprisonment as a material witness would have been eliminated.
Leaving to the side the strength of his perjury charge, if Awadallah had testified at a prompt
deposition in the same allegedly untruthful manner he testified before the grand jury, the
Government could have criminally charged and detained him on the basis of his deposition
testimony. Moreover, the deposition testimony would not have been tainted by a highly
questionable incarceration, which in the final analysis was the principal basis for Judge
Scheindlin’s suppression of the evidence of, inter alia, perjury that the Government wished to
use against him.
The question of whether the federal material witness statute’s reference to “criminal
proceedings” includes grand jury proceedings is doubtless one of substantial ambiguity. The
attempts of the Bacon, Awadallah III, and In re Material Witness Warrant courts to resolve that
ambiguity by reference to statutory “context” and legislative history was based on well
established rules of statutory construction, but the use of those rules were clearly wielded in a
highly result-oriented fashion. In terms of “real world” practicalities, Judge Scheindlin’s
decision is doubtlessly correct on the abhorrent facts of that case, but it does not, as a general
matter, accommodate what may be a legitimate and compelling governmental concern: that a
grand jury material witness may flee the jurisdiction or the country if his or her testimony is not
secured. Under her holding that section 3144 never applies to grand jury proceedings, the
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government can never secure the testimony of a witness whose appearance at the grand jury
proceeding is questionable. If Rule 15, however, allows for a pre-grand jury deposition, as Chief
Judge Mukasey suggested, then “fear of flight” can be accommodated by the taking of a
deposition.
In resolving whether a material witness may be deposed to secure testimony for a grand
jury under Rule 15, two points should be dispositive. First, if as Chief Judge Mukasey argued,
legislative reports underlying the federal material witness statute are to be given great weight,289
the emphatic language in the relevant Senate Committee Report that the availability of
deposition in lieu of incarceration is a central component of that statute should be controlling.
Second, if the statute is otherwise somehow ambiguous on this point, even Chief Judge Mukasey
contended that Rule 15 can reasonably be read to provide “the remedy of testimony by
deposition . . . to a grand jury witness when, for example, the grand jury before which the
witness is to testify cannot convene promptly.”290 It is well settled that an ambiguous statute
must be given a reading that avoids constitutional difficulties. The Supreme Court has stated, “If
an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, and
where an alternative interpretation of the statute is ‘fairly possible,’ [courts] are obliged to
construe the statute to avoid such problems.” 291 As Chief Judge Mukasey contends, there is at
the very least a “fairly plausible” reading of Rule 15 that would provide a material witness
deposition tailored to the pre-grand jury setting. Otherwise, the stark constitutional issue Judge
Scheindlin confronted concerning indefinite incarceration without the availability of a deposition
would raise the specter of a Fourth Amendment violation.
On appeal to the Second Circuit, one would have hoped that the Awadallah court would
have followed what appears to have been the logical extension of Chief Judge Mukasey’s
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reasoning and would have held that detaining a material witness for twenty days without bail or a
deposition violates section 3144 or constitutes an illegal seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
The Second Circuit traveled part way down that path by finding that section 3144 and Rule 15 do
make depositions available in the grand jury context.292 It also noted, “[I]t would be improper
for the government to use § 3144 for other ends, such as the detention of persons suspected of
criminal activity for which probable cause has not yet been established.”293 However, the
Second Circuit surprisingly concluded that even though a deposition is available for grand jury
material witnesses under section 3144, a deposition need not be taken if the detainee is offered a
bail hearing, even if bail is denied. 294 Therefore, rather than properly balancing both parties’
competing interests, the Second Circuit’s rationale abandoned the best parts of Judge Scheindlin
and Chief Judge Mukasey’s opinions and reached a result that implicitly endorsed the
Government’s indefinite and coercive detentions of grand jury material witnesses. Nowhere did
the Second Circuit explain how such an indefinite detention without probable cause of having
committed a crime would not run afoul of its warning, in dictum, that the federal material witness
statute should not be abused by making arrests without probable cause.
VII.

AWADALLAH ON APPEAL TO THE SECOND CIRCUIT

On appeal to the Second Circuit, the Government did not challenge Judge Scheindlin’s
factual findings, and the Second Circuit approved and adopted them in all but one limited
circumstance.295 With regard to the abusive and coercive conditions of Awadallah’s
confinement, the Second Circuit said that those allegations were immaterial to the issues before
the district court,296 a conclusion which obviously aided the appellate court in ultimately finding
that Awadallah’s confinement did not violate the Fourth Amendment. By largely ignoring his
conditions of confinement, the Second Circuit also was able to avoid mentioning that “many” of
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Awadallah’s allegations regarding treatment during his harsh detention were uncontested by the
Government.297 Furthermore, the Second Circuit failed to take judicial notice of a widelypublicized, contemporaneous United States Department of Justice - Office of the Inspector
General report criticizing the abusive conditions of confinement faced by September 11
detainees in similar New York detention facilities.298
A.

The Reach of Section 3144

The Second Circuit reviewed Judge Scheindlin and Chief Judge Mukasey’s decisions as
they pertained to the question of whether grand jury proceedings were included within the term
“criminal proceeding” in section 3144. In so doing, it looked at the plain language of the statute,
interpretations of “proceeding” or “criminal proceeding” in other contexts, and the statutory
context of section 3144 itself.299 The court agreed with Judge Scheindlin and disagreed with
Chief Judge Mukasey regarding the textual clarity of section 3144.300 It found the plain language
of section 3144 to be highly ambiguous, and concluded that “we must look beyond the text of §
3144 to discern the meaning of ‘criminal proceeding.’”301
In that regard, the court examined section 3144’s legislative history for an interpretive
clue.302 The Second Circuit fully endorsed Chief Judge Mukasey’s reliance on the footnote of a
Senate Judiciary Committee report accompanying the Bail Reform Act of 1984,303 which cited
Bacon to support the committee’s summary statement that the term “criminal proceeding” in
section 3144 includes grand jury proceedings.304 The appellate court found the Senate Judiciary
Committee’s express ratification of Bacon dispositive on the question of the drafters’ intent, and
concluded, “[A] grand jury proceeding is a ‘criminal proceeding’ for purposes of § 3144.”305
In order to fully support the conclusion that section 3144 applied to grand juries, the
Second Circuit still had to contend with Judge Scheindlin’s ruling that Rule 15 (governing
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depositions) did not apply in the grand jury context. Her finding in this regard was consistent
with the Government’s reading of the rule at the time.306 Obviously recognizing that its assertion
before the district court undercut the argument that section 3144 (which references Rule 15) does
apply to those bodies, the Government switched its position on appeal and argued that a grand
jury material witness can receive a deposition in lieu of detention under Rule 15 and section
3144.307 The Government explained this awkward reversal by stating it was now persuaded by
the expansive reading of Rule 15 suggested by Chief Judge Mukasey.308 While openly troubled
by this “change of heart” on appeal, the Second Circuit reluctantly accepted the Government’s
justification and agreed that Rule 15 is flexible enough to allow the testimony of grand jury
material witnesses to be secured by deposition.309 However, the switch in the Government’s
position forced the Second Circuit to face the much more difficult question of whether the Fourth
Amendment allowed the Government to imprison Awadallah for as long as it did without
probable cause of having committed a crime and without affording him either of section 3144’s
two ameliorative options for release: bail or a deposition in lieu of continued detention.
B.

Constitutional Analysis

In setting the stage for its determination that section 3144 survived constitutional
analysis, even as applied to Awadallah’s predicament, the Second Circuit explored the canon of
constitutional avoidance by which a court refrains from reading an ambiguous statute to be
unconstitutional if a plausible, constitutionally-satisfactory interpretation exists.310 The court
explained that the canon comes into play only if the statute is ambiguous and “there are serious
concerns about the statute’s constitutionality.”311
The Second Circuit found that Awadallah’s twenty day detention as a material witness
prior to his grand jury testimony did not raise “serious concerns” by surprisingly and
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inexplicably concluding that Awadallah’s two failed bail hearings while he was incarcerated
made his detention reasonable.312 In this regard, the Second Circuit offered findings from the
unsuccessful bail hearings that concluded Awadallah was a flight risk and that his detention was
“reasonable under the circumstances.” 313 In so ruling, the appellate court failed to address the
text of section 3144 which expressly states that except where it would cause a “failure of
justice,” a deposition was to be afforded to an arrested material witness who could not make bail.
The appellate court also completely ignored the entire tenor of the Senate Judiciary Committee
report accompanying section 3144 which stated, “[T]he committee stresses that whenever
possible, the depositions of such witnesses should be obtained so that they may be released from
custody.”314 It also ignored that report’s emphatic instruction to the judiciary that when material
witnesses cannot meet the conditions of bail, “the judicial officer is required to order the
witness’ release after the taking of the deposition if this will not result in a failure of justice.”315
Finally, the Second Circuit ignored the fact that section 3144 was originally derived from an
integral part of the Bail Reform Act of 1966 – an Act whose entire purpose was “to assure that
all persons, regardless of their financial status, shall not needlessly be detained pending their
appearance to answer charges, to testify, or pending appeal, when detention serves neither the
ends of justice nor the public interest.”316 Disregarding these fundamental mandates from the
legislative history was especially surprising given the Second Circuit’s dispositive deference to a
single footnote within the Senate Judiciary Committee report summarily stating that section 3144
applied to grand juries.317
The Second Circuit also defended its finding that no serious constitutional concerns exist
by citing several supposedly supportive decisions,318 all of which were inapposite. First and
foremost, none of the cases construed the constitutionality of section 3144, or its predecessor
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section 3149. Other decisions relied on by the Second Circuit in Awadallah did not contain
constitutional challenges to any material witness statute. The musings over material witness
statutes in those cases were irrelevant to the holdings, i.e., they were dicta.319 A separate case
did uphold the constitutionality of a state material witness statute under the Privileges and
Immunities Clauses of Article IV and the Fourteenth Amendment, but not the Fourth
Amendment.320
Although two of the cited cases, United States ex rel. Glinton v. Denno (Glinton II) and
United States ex rel. Allen v. La Vallee – both decided in the 1960s – did involve Fourth
Amendment challenges, they concerned a New York state material witness statute significantly
different than section 3144. In those two cases, the New York statute required that material
witnesses be released or given conditions of bail, and it did not prohibit the use of a deposition as
one of those conditions.321 The defendants in those cases could not satisfy their respective bail
requirements.322 Awadallah had been flatly denied bail and the chance to offer his testimony via
deposition.323 Ironically, of course, he was ultimately afforded bail after being charged, and his
reliability as a material witness is evidenced by the fact that, even as of this writing (over two
years after his initial arrest), he is still free on bail, satisfying the conditions of his release, and
awaiting trial.324
Furthermore, the 1969 Allen decision acknowledged that the then-recent expansion of
Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights may have dictated a different result in Allen, if recent
precedent could be applied retroactively to the facts of that case.325 The clear implication of
Allen was that, in future cases, the circumstances faced by Allen and Glinton would be found
unconstitutional. As additional evidence of the statute’s questionable nature, the New York
legislature added further procedural protections to that state’s material witness statute in the year
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following Allen.326 Because of the expansion of constitutional rights since the mid-1960s, the
Second Circuit’s reliance in Awadallah upon opinions over 35 years old to support the
continuing validity of indefinitely detaining a federal grand jury material witness without
probable cause is, at the very least, highly questionable.
C. The Impact of the Second Circuit’s Ruling for Awadallah
In the end, the Second Circuit reversed and remanded Awadallah to the district court with
instructions to reinstate the perjury charges,327 even though Awadallah had been coercively
detained in prison for twenty days as a material witness, in a prison designed for convicted
criminals, without probable cause of having committed a crime, or the opportunity to free
himself through bail or a deposition in lieu of further detention. This holding represents nothing
less than a wholehearted endorsement of the Justice Department’s material witness policies put
in place after September 11, 2001. Moreover, recent press reports indicate that the Justice
Department has taken the Second Circuit’s authorization of its detention practices to heart, and it
has continued its secretive and coercive material witness incarcerations.328
VIII.

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

In In re Material Witness Warrant, Chief Judge Mukasey strongly hinted at a result that
should have satisfied both parties before the Second Circuit: Rule 15 together with section 3144
might be malleable enough to require a material witness’ deposition in lieu of bail or continued
incarceration.329 His suggestion accommodated the interests of all parties. It allowed the
Government to obtain grand jury testimony, but minimized the intrusion on the material witness’
liberty interests by affording them their freedom via bail or a deposition. It is also important to
emphasize that were the Government required to depose grand jury witnesses who cannot be
released on bail, it would not be without weapons to deal with suspected “bad actors” for whom
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it has no probable cause to detain on a long term basis. For example, if a material witness has
been involved in as yet undetected criminal wrongdoing, that information is just as likely to be
developed in a prompt, post-detention deposition. If Awadallah did in fact perjure himself
before the grand jury, as the Government alleges, he likely would have testified to the same
effect in a deposition.
The Second Circuit, in principle, adopted Chief Judge Mukasey’s position and found that
prompt depositions were available in the way that he had proposed.330 However, when one
considers the Second Circuit’s opinion in tandem with the lengthy detentions of Awadallah and
Abdallah Higazy,331 not to mention the Justice Department’s report detailing the abusive
conditions endured by September 11 detainees,332 the court effectively read the deposition
alternative out of section 3144. Without providing guidelines to educate the Government about
the conditions under which depositions are proper for grand jury material witnesses, or when
their release on bail would cause a “failure of justice,” the Second Circuit gave the Government
license to detain material witnesses for lengthy periods of time, in highly coercive circumstances,
without probable cause of having committed a crime.
It is quite possible that the Second Circuit was, in fact, concerned that Awadallah’s
testimony would not be adequately captured in a deposition or that his release would cause a
“failure of justice,” as that term is used in section 3144. The attacks on the World Trade Center
and the Pentagon were still very fresh in Americans’ minds when Awadallah was first arrested as
a material witness to those attacks. Perhaps the need to discover the person or persons
responsible for these unprecedented attacks on American soil, or the need to interrupt other
imminent attacks might at least be an arguable basis for justifying Awadallah’s continued
detention. Indeed, it may be plausibly argued that the days and weeks following September 11
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were extraordinary times that may have required exceptional and extraordinary means to
preserve our country’s safety. However, the Second Circuit nowhere limited its ruling in this
way. Moreover, while stating in dictum that “it would be improper for the government to use §
3144 for…the detention of persons suspected of criminal activity for which probable cause has
not yet been established,”333 the appellate court astonishingly failed to distinguish Awadallah’s
detention from that very same circumstance – using section 3144 to arrest without probable
cause.
As a practical matter, this may not be the end of Awadallah’s litigation. As of this
writing in early January 2004, one could foresee, for example, Awadallah petitioning the United
States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. Because the government is continuing its practice
of coercively detaining grand jury material witnesses for lengthy amounts of time, those that
have been denied bail or deposition in lieu of detention, may be able to challenge detentions
occurring in other federal circuits. Therefore, a circuit split on this issue might be created,
attracting the attention of the U.S. Supreme Court, if it does not ultimately consider Awadallah
itself.
However, if the bewildering nature of the Bacon, Awadallah, and In re Material Witness
litigation suggests anything, it is that section 3144 as presently written is highly confusing and
ambiguous. Resolving lengthy federal material witness detentions also calls into play
complicated constitutional analysis. The far better approach would be to strive for immediate
congressional clarification of the federal material witness statute.
To avoid further judicial wrangling, Congress should promptly revisit section 3144 and
clearly rewrite it in a way that accommodates the government’s need to secure grand jury
testimony, while avoiding what amounts to unjustifiable and coercive detentions of material
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witnesses. It should provide that: (1) “criminal proceeding” includes grand jury proceedings;
and (2) except in highly exigent circumstances, the deposition alternative is available for federal
material witnesses who are not eligible for, or cannot meet, conditions of bail.
It cannot be under civilized principles of constitutional jurisprudence that the government
can hold a material witness, as it did Awadallah, without probable cause, in prison under highly
coercive circumstances, for an indefinite period (or, under the most generous count to the
Government, twenty days in the case of Awadallah). The constitutional rule announced by the
Second Circuit in Awadallah amounts to nothing less than sanctioning the practice of holding
detainees in highly coercive circumstances to obtain unreliable, incriminating testimony in the
absence of probable cause. A halt must be put to this punitive, suspect, and wholly unnecessary
practice.
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